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To Resuscitate or Not... In the Operating
Room: The Need for Hospital Policies for
Surgeons Regarding DNR Orders
Vassyl A. Lonchyna*
"As to diseases make a habit of two things-to help, or at
least, to do no harm."
-Hippocrates
In the wake of the deaths of national figures such as President
Richard M. Nixon, First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, and
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, Americans are exhibiting a different
attitude toward dying and the care given at the end of life.1
Richard Nixon had a living will 2 that stated he did not wish to
have the assistance of a breathing machine to sustain his life.
Following his stroke in April of 1994, doctors honored this ad-
vance medical directive 3 and allowed him to die peacefully with-
* Dr. Lonchyna is an associate professor in the Department of Thoracic and Car-
diovascular Surgery and the Surgical Director of the Lung Transplant Program at
Loyola University Medical Center in Maywood, Illinois. He received his Bachelor of
Science from the University of Detroit, and his Doctor of Medicine from Wayne State
University. He is currently a candidate for a Masters of Jurisprudence in Health Law
at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1. Richard A. Knox, Americans Changing How They Die, TAMPA TRIB.-TIMES,
May 29, 1994, at 18.
2. A living will is "[a] document which governs the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment from an individual in the event of an incurable or irrevers-
ible condition that will cause death within a relatively short time, [when the individ-
ual] is no longer able to make decisions regarding his or her medical treatment."
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1599 (6th ed. 1990). Almost all states have statutes gov-
erning these written declarations. See, e.g., Illinois Living Will Act, 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 35/1-35/10 (West 1992).
3. Advance medical directives consist of instructions by the patient while compe-
tent, including living wills and durable powers of attorney. The more information the
patient divulges in the directive, the better it becomes for the health care provider
and/or proxy surrogate to interpret what medical therapy to apply, especially when
the patient is incapacitated. Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and
Best Interests: Toward a Constructive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously Com-
petent Patients Without Advance Instructions, 48 RUTGERs L. REv. 1193, 124142
(1996). The situations that should be considered are coma, dementia, chronic disabil-
ity, and temporary incapacity to make decisions. The interventions that should be
listed include cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR"), mechanical ventilation, dialy-
sis, blood transfusions, nutrition and hydration, antibiotics, diagnostic tests, and pain
medications. Linda L. Emanuel & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Medical Directive: A New
Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 261 JAMA 3288 (1989). Congress passed
1
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out his life being artificially prolonged with a ventilator.'
Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis refused antibiotic treatment for
pneumonia after being told by doctors that there was no further
therapy for the advanced lymphoma she was battling. She chose
to go home and die without any further medical interventions,
which would have simply prolonged the dying process.5 Joseph
Cardinal Bernardin discontinued further chemotherapy when he
learned that pancreatic cancer had spread to his liver. He stated
that he did not wish to pursue exotic methods to prolong life
and accepted the natural process. 6
News of the fact that these revered public figures had living
wills spurred renewed public interest in advance medical direc-
tives.7 It was reported that a study presented at the American
Geriatric Society meeting disclosed that most dying patients
and/or their families are deciding not to allow resuscitation in
the event of a cardiac arrest." The results of an American Medi-
cal Association ("AMA") survey show the ever-increasing con-
cern of Americans about issues of medical ethics such as the
medical care given at the end of life and adherence to directives
such as living wills.9
In the hospital setting, cardiopulmonary resuscitation is auto-
matically performed in the case of a respiratory and/or cardiac
arrest. The legal basis for this immediate response is the pre-
sumed consent of an individual to maintain life. This treatment
is withheld if there is a willful order to the contrary-in other
words, a "Do Not Resuscitate" or "DNR" order. With proper
communication by the attending physician and informed con-
sent, the patient, the patient's family, or the patient's surrogate
legislation in 1991 that requires any institution that accepts Medicare or Medicaid
funds to inform adult patients and give them written information about their rights to
accept or decline therapy according to the laws of the individual states, give them
written policies and procedures of the institution respecting these patients' rights, and
document all of this in the medical record. The Patient Self-Determination Act, Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206 & 4751, 104
Stat. 1388-115 & 1388-204 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., espe-
cially §§ 1395cc(f) & 1396a(w) (1995)).
4. Knox, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Steve Kloehn, Bernardin Ends Cancer Care, Chemotherapy Hasn't Reduced Tu-
mor Size, Cm. TRIB., Oct. 18, 1996, at 1.
7. Patients Ask: "If Jackie Had a Living Wil4 Shouldn't I?", Am. MED. NEWS, June
13, 1994, at 16.
8. Knox, supra note 1.
9. Marilyn Chase, Consumers Need to be Active in Debates on Medical Ethics,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1997, at Bi.
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may conclude that if the patient has a terminal condition, any
measure to prolong life in the case of an untoward event, such as
a cardiopulmonary arrest, would be futile'0 and, therefore, un-
wanted. This order is specifically entered in the medical
record."
But what happens when a patient who has a terminal condi-
tion,'12 who has decided to forgo extraordinary medical proce-
dures, and who has an order countermanding resuscitation
undergoes a wanted surgical procedure? Does the DNR order
stand in the operating room? Because there are scarce hospital
policies defining this situation, a dilemma occurs as to whether
the DNR order should be adhered to, should be temporarily
suspended, 3 or should be temporarily renegotiated.
10. Futile means "serving no useful purpose; completely ineffective." MERRIAM
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 475 (10th ed. 1993). It is difficult to define
when medical treatment is futile. The question must be asked: "Futile in relationship
to what?" Robert D. Truog et al., The Problem with Futility, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1560, 1561 (1992). This implies a value judgment. For example, you must ask whether
the likelihood that the therapy (e.g., CPR) will be effective (i.e., in resuscitating the
patient) is slim, and the therapy, therefore, quantitatively futile, or whether the mag-
nitude of the benefit is slim (e.g., the patient is resuscitated temporarily but does not
survive to be discharged from the hospital) and therefore qualitatively futile. Nancy
S. Jecker, Calling It Quits: Stopping Futile Treatments and Caring for Patients, 5 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 138, 138-39 (1994); Steven Miles, Futility and Medical Professional-
ism, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 873, 877 (1995). Although there is no national standard
of futility, communities and institutions have been encouraged to develop standards.
As an example, the Santa Monica Hospital Medical Center published a definition of
futile care: "Any clinical circumstance in which the doctor and his or her consultants,
consistent with the available medical literature, conclude that further treatment (ex-
cept comfort care) cannot, within a reasonable possibility, cure, ameliorate, improve
or restore a quality of life satisfactory to the patient." Cost-Conscious Hospitals Set
Futile Care Rules, Am. MED. NEWS, June 28, 1993, at 3. A recent collaboration of the
major medical institutions in Houston, Texas, resulted in a procedural policy on medi-
cal futility. It requires participation of the physician, patient (and/or surrogate), and
an institutional review board. A physician may not act unilaterally, the patient main-
tains the right to be transferred, and the patient is never abandoned. Amir Halevy &
Baruch A. Brody, A Multi-Institution Collaborative Policy on Medical Futility, 276
JAMA 571 (1996).
11. See, e.g., Foster G. McGaw Hospital/Loyola University Medical Center, Ad-
ministrative Policy 10-0032.17, Do Not Resuscitate 1 (May 8, 1992) [hereinafter
LUMC DNR Policy] (on fie with the Annals of Health Law).
12. A terminal condition is defined broadly as "an incurable and irreversible con-
dition which is such that death is imminent and the application of death delaying
procedures serves only to prolong the dying process." Illinois Living Will Act, 755
ILL. COmP. STAT. ANN. 35/2(h) (West 1992).
13. See, e.g., Alexian Brothers Medical Center, Administrative Policy and Proce-
dure Manual No. 950/2050/001.00, Do Not-Resuscitate Orders 7 (Nov. 1, 1991) [here-
inafter Alexian Brothers DNR Policy] (on file with the Annals of Health Law).
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This article will explain cardiopulmonary resuscitation, the
legal basis for administering therapy, and DNR orders. It will
describe the operating room environment and why a DNR order
may be philosophically unpalatable and, therefore, untenable by
the medical personnel caring for the patient. The article will
then discuss three possible approaches to the problem of what
to do with a DNR order of a patient going to the operating
room for a procedure: (1) automatically suspend it, (2) strictly
adhere to it, or (3) prior to the patient's surgery, reconsider the
DNR order for the surgery time period. This article concludes
that regardless of what approach a hospital takes, it must create
policies to provide direction to the surgical team.
I. WHAT IS CARDIOPULMONARY RESUSCITATION?
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") is the "restoration of
cardiac output and pulmonary ventilation following cardiac
arrest and apnea, using artificial respiration and manual closed
chest compression or open chest cardiac massage." 14 In other
words, through manual compression the heart begins to beat
again, oxygen is provided by blowing it directly into the lungs,
and life is restored. Initiated in the 1960s,' 5 it is a successful
technique in reviving patients from imminent death. Within a
hospital setting, "code teams" of physicians and nurses are or-
ganized to respond to arrests. For out-of-hospital arrests, vic-
tims must depend on bystander participation in rescue breathing
and CPR as well as quick responses by emergency medical
services.16
The elements necessary for successful resuscitation include an
early and quick response, initiation of bystander CPR, early
defibrillation of ventricular arrhythmias,"7 and early advanced
14. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1534 (26th ed. 1995).
15. The first report showed a 70% survival rate among the 20 patients on which it
was performed. Willem van Kouwenhoven et al., Closed-Chest Cardiac Massage, 173
JAMA 1064, 1064 (1960).
16. If spontaneous circulation does not return when advanced cardiac life support
is administered by the paramedics, it is unlikely that the patient will be successfully
resuscitated after being transported back to the hospital. Arthur L. Vellerman et al.,
Predicting the Outcome of Unsuccessful Prehospital Advanced Cardiac Life Support,
270 JAMA 1433, 1433 (1993).
17. Defibrillation of the ventricular arrhythmias directs a burst of electrical cur-
rent at the erratically contracting cardiac muscle so that the electrical activity becomes
organized and recruits the cardiac muscle into coordinated contractions and produces
a forward flow of blood.
[Vol. 6212
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cardiac life support.' As an example, in a study of 3243 consec-
utive out-of-hospital cardiac arrests in New York City, overall
survival was only 1.4%. 19 This was partly attributable to the
lengthy response time and lack of bystander intervention.20 To
achieve survival and neurological recovery, basic life support
consisting of CPR should be initiated within four minutes of
arrest and more advanced techniques of cardiac support within
eight minutes.21 However, of those in-hospital patients who re-
ceive CPR, few-on average, fifteen percent-recover from
their underlying illness to be ultimately discharged.22 Hospital-
ized patients who are most likely to survive CPR are those with
sudden cardiopulmonary collapse due to an acute cardiovascular
illness, whereas those least likely to survive are patients with
debilitating illness, widespread cancer, repeated arrests, and
chronic illnesses.23 Among patients who survived CPR but were
not discharged from the hospital, the length of survival ranged
from two to fourteen days.24 This has prompted many studies
about the efficacy of the application of CPR and has caused
18. Emergency Cardiac Care Committee and Subcommittees, Am. Heart Ass'n,
Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiac Care, 268
JAMA 2171, 2184 (1992) [hereinafter Guidelines for CPR].
19. Gary Lombardi et al., Outcome of Out-of-Hospital Cardiac Arrest in New
York City, 271 JAMA 678, 678 (1994).
20. Id. at 680.
21. Guidelines for CPR, supra note 18, at 2184.
22. An early study from Denmark, at a time when coronary care units were first
organized, showed a reasonable effectiveness of the resuscitative process for patients
suffering a cardiac arrest both on the ward and in the unit. Thirty-eight of 161 pa-
tients (24%) survived to be discharged from the hospital. Bo Dupont et al., The
Long-Term Prognosis for Patients Resuscitated After Cardiac Arrest, 78 AM. HEART J.
444, 445 (1969). At the Beth Israel Hospital in Boston, 30% of patients dying under-
went CPR. Of 294 patients reported, 128 (44%) survived the resuscitation effort but
only 41 (14%) were discharged from the hospital. Susanna E. Bedell et al., Survival
After Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in the Hospital, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 569, 569-
70 (1983). A literature review of 42 publications revealed that of 12,961 patients re-
suscitated, CPR was initially successful in 38.5% of patients, but only 14.6% (range,
3% to 27%) were discharged from the hospital. Roland B. McGrath, In-House Cardi-
opulmonary Resuscitation - After a Quarter of a Century, 16 ANNALS EMERGENCY
MED. 1365, 1365 (1987). A report from Sinai Hospital of Detroit states that out of
105 hospitalized patients who received CPR, 98 died during their hospitalization, four
underwent coronary artery bypass grafting and survived, three died shortly after dis-
charge, and one remained in a persistent vegetative state. Stephanie C. Warner &
Tann K. Sharma, Outcome of Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Predictors of Resus-
citation Status in an Urban Community Teaching Hospital, 27 RESUSCITATION 13, 13
(1994).
23. Alfred L. George, Jr. et al., Pre-Arrest Morbidity and Other Correlates of Sur-
vival After In-Hospital Cardiopulmonary Arrest, 87 AM. J. MED. 28, 32 (1989).
24. Leslie J. Blackhall, Must We Always Use CPR9, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1281,
1283 (1987).
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medical personnel to rethink its application in the hospital set-
ting.25 Many patients may choose to forgo CPR by consenting
to a DNR order. This concept will be explained below in section
III.
Of all the settings in the hospital, the operating room is the
best place for the patient to be if there is a need for resuscitation
because the environment is highly controlled. The equipment
and technology needed to resuscitate a dying patient is available
at the health care provider's fingertips. Teams of operating
room personnel are available to act in unison to do everything
humanly possible (within the realm of modem medical technol-
ogy) to reverse the life-threatening event. The anesthesiologist
is able to provide a secure airway, control a patient's breathing,
and administer drugs to maintain circulation. The surgeon can
perform CPR by closed-chest massage, or ultimately-in a man-
ner not possible anywhere else in the hospital-the surgeon
could place the patient on cardiopulmonary bypass to take over
the work of the heart and lungs while simultaneously addressing
the cause of the arrest, be it trauma, embolization, hemorrhage,
or a primary cardiac event.
Given the principles of informed consent, discussed in the
next section, the reality that the surgical ward is the best place to
receive CPR, and the fact that the patient wanted and consented
to the surgical procedure, the surgical team must know what to
do with a DNR order during surgery.
II. INFORMED CONSENT
A. The Legal and Ethical Foundations of Informed Consent
In order to administer medical therapy to a patient, a physi-
cian must have the consent or permission of the patient for a
particular intervention. The legal concept of consent for medi-
25. There is a conflict between doing a procedure because technically it can be
done (and justifying it by saying one cannot predict with certainty the outcome) and
forgoing this procedure because it would simply prolong suffering, delay the dying
process, and remove the patient's dignity in the dying moment. Maurice Fox & He-
lene Levens Lipton, The Decision to Perform Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 309
NEW ENG. J. MED. 607, 607 (1983).
For illnesses where CPR has been shown to be of no benefit (for example, meta-
static cancer, acute stroke, sepsis, or pneumonia), some recommend that CPR should
not be considered an option of medical therapy. Rather, it is suggested that a DNR
order (written under the unilateral authority of the physician) should be accompanied
by a note in the chart stating the condition for which CPR is futile and recommending
that CPR not be performed. See, e.g., Blackhall, supra note 24, at 1282, 1284.
[Vol. 6
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cal treatment evolved in this century under tort law.26 Operat-
ing on a part of the body for which the patient did not give
consent (expressed or implied) was unlawful and, therefore,
constituted a battery.27 Justice Cardozo is often quoted for pro-
viding the legal basis for consent: "Every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an opera-
tion without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which
he is liable in damages. ' '2 The doctrine requires the physician
or agent to disclose any information necessary for the patient to
make a proper decision and to obtain a voluntary consent.
Courts of most states now recognize a lack of informed con-
sent cause of action under the law of negligence for an abroga-
tion of the duty.29 In addition, all states have legislated
minimum standards of disclosure that the medical profession
must meet prior to performing invasive procedures.30
Informed consent is a well-established standard of medical
ethics. The American Medical Association has, since its incep-
tion in 1847, maintained a code of ethics for its members.31 The
basic rights of patients are enunciated in the "Fundamental Ele-
ments of the Patient-Physician Relationship." In the opinion on
informed consent, the AMA stated: "The physician's obligation
is to present the medical facts accurately to the patient... [and]
to make recommendations... to help the patient make choices
from among the therapeutic alternatives .... 32
Through medical ethics principles and legal doctrine, in-
formed consent has evolved into an informed decision-making
process. In order to make a decision as to whether to consent to
26. Anthony Szczygiel, Beyond Informed Consent, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 171,
184-85 (1994).
27. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 14 (Minn. 1905) (noting that "the right to the
inviolability of [the patient's] person" prohibits a surgeon, no matter how skilled or
how successful the operation, from "violating" that person without consent).
28. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
29. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The pa-
tient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal... [and] can
be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an
intelligent choice."). See also Jon F. Merz, On a Decision-making Paradigm of Medi-
cal Informed Consent, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 231, 232-33 (1993); Szczygiel, supra note 26,
at 209-11.
30. See Szczygiel, supra note 26, at 190.
31. Nancy W. Dickey, AMA Code of Medical Ethics a Link to Our Past, Am.
MED. NEWS, Mar. 24/31, 1997, at 21.
32. COUNCIL OF ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AM. MED. A S'N, CODE
OF MEDICAL ETIcs 120 (1997).
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a particular form of therapy, the patient must be given sufficient
information about the procedure, its risks and benefits, and the
alternatives to the proposed therapy. The patient may then
agree or refuse to proceed.
B. Presumed Consent
Courts recognize an exception to obtaining an informed con-
sent for bona fide emergency situations, where the life and
health of the person must be preserved and consent could not be
obtained in any fashion. It is permissible for, even the duty of,
the surgeon to perform a life-saving emergency operation with-
out consent.33 Courts base this concept of implied or presumed
consent on the theory that they do not wish any rule or principle
of law to interfere with emergency treatment 4 When faced
with the threat of the loss of life or serious disability, it is pre-
sumed that any reasonable person would consent to proper
medical therapy. If the patient is unconscious, if no family
members are available to consult, or if the situation warrants an
immediate response (for example, hemorrhage, respiratory ces-
sation, or cardiac arrest), the physician has the duty to intervene
responsibly at the level of acceptable medical practice.35 It is
important for the physician to document the nature of the emer-
gency and the reason why consent cannot be obtained.36
C. CPR by Presumed Consent
CPR is classified as an "emergency procedure" by hospitals
and other medical institutions and is automatically instituted for
any patient who suffers a cardiac arrest, regardless of the under-
lying disease.37 This is performed on patients on the basis of
presumed consent.38 Consent is presumed because at the time
33. This principle was founded in turn-of-the-century cases such as Pratt v. Davis,
79 N.E. 562, 565 (1M1. 1906), and Mohr, 104 N.W. at 15.
34. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93; see also Mohr, 104 N.W. at 15 (Minn. 1905);
Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. 1952) (surgeon's removal of Fallopian
tubes without consent actionable because not under emergency circumstances); RE.
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892D (1979).
35. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93; see also Pratt, 79 N.E. at 565; Luka v. Lowrie, 136
N.W. 1106, 1110 (Mich. 1912); Jackovach v. Yocom, 237 N.W. 444, 449-50 (Iowa
1931).
36. Emidio A. Bianco & Harold L. Hirsh, Consent to and Refusal of Medical
Treatment, in LEGAL MEDICINE 274,283-84 (American College of Legal Medicine ed.,
1995).
37. Blackhall, supra note 24, at 1282-83.
38. Kathleen M. Boozang, Death Wisk Resuscitating Self-Determination for the
Critically Ill, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 23, 25 (1993).
[Vol. 6
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of arrest, the patient is incapable of giving informed consent and
the lack of initiating immediate treatment will result in severe
neurological damage and death.39 It is also the legal responsibil-
ity of physicians and nurses who are on duty to institute CPR
when medically indicated unless a contrary order is given.40
CPR is the only medical intervention that can be performed by a
nonphysician without a physician's order.
There are two exceptions to the institution of CPR on the ba-
sis of presumed consent.4 1 First, patients may positively influ-
ence their hospital course by denying permission to administer
CPR in the event of cardiac arrest by way of an advance direc-
tive or recorded discussions with medical personnel. 42 For ex-
ample, a terminally ill patient may refuse CPR, in which case the
physician enters a DNR order, as explained below. Patients
need to discuss options early in their medical course. If the pa-
tient is unable or incapable of making a decision, the family or
surrogate may make this decision.4 3
Second, the medical profession recognizes that there are in-
stances when initiating resuscitation would be inappropriate.
Specifically, resuscitation might be inappropriate if the treat-
ment would have "no medical benefit" (in other words, it would
be futile), if the quality of life after CPR would be poor, or if the
quality of life before resuscitation is already poor.44 Treatment
would be futile, for example, if the patient had metastatic carci-
noma and further medical therapy would not provide any physi-
39. Peter J.F. Baskett, Ethics in Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, RESUSCITATION,
Feb. 1993, at 1, 2.
40. Id. at 4.
41. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Guidelines for the
Appropriate Use of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 265 JAMA 1868, 1868 (1991).
42. Id. See, e.g., Illinois Living Will Act, 755 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 30/1 (West
1997).
43. Jerry A. Menikoff et al., Beyond Advance Directives - Health Care Surrogate
Laws, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1165, 1165 (1992). See generally Stephen M. Fatum et
al., A Review of the Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act, 80 ILL. B.J. 124 (1992) (discuss-
ing the background and specific provisions of the Illinois statute).
44. Paul Goulden, Non-Treatment Orders, Including Do Not Resuscitate (DNR), in
PINCIPLES OF HEALTH CARE ETHics, 734-35 (Raanan Gillon ed., 1994). See also
Keith Shiner, Note, Medical Futility: A Futile Concept?, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 803,
838-39 (1996); George J. Annas, The "Right to Die" in America: Sloganeering from
Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and Kevorkian, 34 Duo. L. REV. 875, 887-88 (1996).
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ologic improvement.45 There are a variety of views on the issue
of futility.46
III. "Do NOT RESuscrrATE" ORDERS
Given that presumed consent for CPR of hospitalized patients
leads to nearly indiscriminate and universal use of the proce-
dure, hospitals have recognized instances when a patient may
request a DNR order.47 DNR orders are appropriate only for
the terminally ill patient, in other words, one who is facing im-
minent death.48 The courts, legislatures, and medical profession
have all recognized the value of DNR orders and patient auton-
omy in deciding when to forgo resuscitation.
In the leading case of In re Dinnerstein,49 the court deter-
mined that a physician may enter such an order without the per-
mission of the court. In that case, the family of an incompetent
patient in a vegetative state pleaded with the court to allow an
order to be entered not to resuscitate the patient should an
arrest occur. The court recognized that the patient's prognosis
was hopeless-"that death must come soon"-and any attempt
at resuscitating the patient would not relieve the illness. 50 There
was no life-prolonging therapy available. The court concluded
that the decision of the appropriate therapy for the patient to
ease her out of her terminal illness was best addressed by her
attending physician, not by the courts. Judicial review should be
performed only if there is a question of whether the medical
practitioner acted at the level of the standard of care.5 '
On December 1, 1991, the concept of self-determination in
health care was codified in the Patient Self-Determination Act,5 2
requiring hospitals and other health care providers participating
in the Medicare and Medicaid programs to give patients infor-
45. Bernard Lo, Unanswered Questions About DNR Orders, 265 JAMA 1874,
1874 (1991).
46. See, e.g., Shiner, supra note 44; Giles R. Scofield, Medical Futility Judgments:
Discriminating or Discriminatory?, 25 SEroN HALL L. Rnv. 927 (1995).
47. See, e.g., LUMC DNR Policy, supra note 11.
48. Mary Ellen Rosen, The Do Not Resuscitate Policy: Jurisdiction Over Policy
and the Therapeutic Privileges, 4 HEALTH LAW. 3, 3 (1990).
49. 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
50. Id. at 138-39.
51. Id. at 139.
52. The Patient Self-Determination Act, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206 & 4751, 104 Stat. 1388-115 & 1388-204 (1991)
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., especially §§ 1395cc(f) & 1396a(w)
(1995)).
218 [Vol. 6
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mation explaining their legal options for refusing or accepting
treatment should they become incapacitated.
Over the past decade, ethicists, physicians, and commissions
have provided guidelines to assist hospitals in developing and
changing policies that address the concept of DNR. In general,
these guidelines have the following principles in common:
(1) DNR orders should be documented in the written medical
record.
(2) DNR orders should specify the exact nature of the treat-
ment to be withheld.
(3) Patients, when they are able, and families should partici-
pate in DNR decisions. Their involvement and wishes should
be documented in the medical record.(4) Decisions to withhold CPR should be discussed with other
staff, including nurses.(5) DNR status should be reviewed on a regular basis.
(6) DNR is not equivalent to medical or psychological aban-
donment of patients.5"
In 1988, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations ("JCAHO") required hospitals to develop a pol-
icy on the withholding of resuscitative services from patients and
has incorporated the above six guidelines into its accreditation
standards.5
Thus, this country has evolved into a nation that allows pa-
tients or their surrogates to make decisions regarding therapeu-
tic alternatives, including the withholding of resuscitation.
IV. CPR IN THE OPERATING ROOM
An area of the hospital where adhering to a DNR order may
be confusing is the operating room. Whether to rescind or
honor the DNR order during surgery is widely debated among
ethicists and medical personnel. 55 In a study at a teaching hospi-
53. Stuart J. Youngner, Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders: No Longer Secret, But Still a
Problem, 17 HASTINGS CErER REP. 24, 25 (1987).
54. THE JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., 2 ACCREDI-
TATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITAlS, RI.1.2.6 & RI.1.2.7, 84-85 (1995).
55. Cynthia B. Cohen & Peter J. Cohen, Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders in the Operat-
ing Room, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1879, 1880 (1991) [hereinafter Cohen & Cohen,
DNR Orders]; Robert D. Truog, "Do Not Resuscitate" Orders During Anesthesia and
Surgery, 74 ANESTHESIOLOGY 606,606 (1991) [hereinafter Truog, DNR Orders]; Rob-
ert M. Walker, DNR in the OR: Resuscitation as an Operative Risk, 266 JAMA 2407,
2407 (1991); Stuart J. Youngner et al., DNR in the Operating Room: Not Really a
Paradox, 266 JAMA 2433, 2433 (1991) [hereinafter Youngner, DNR in the Operating
Room]; see also Letter from Cory Franklin, Chicago Medical School, & David M.
Rothenberg, Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, to the New England Jour-
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tal, fifteen percent of patients with DNR orders underwent a
surgical procedure. 6 Thus, it is not uncommon for the surgical
team to face this issue.
A patient with a DNR order in the operating room seems a
paradoxical situation.57 If one is not going to perform basic life-
saving therapy such as CPR (which has a great chance of success
in the operating room) because of the terminal condition of the
patient or because of the perceived futility of the treatment,
then why should that patient undergo any surgical procedure
that may be meant to cure a potentially life-threatening condi-
tion or improve the quality of the patient's dying days? The an-
swer is clear: A terminally ill patient's decision to refuse
resuscitation is not a decision to refuse palliative surgical proce-
dures that have the opportunity to relieve pain, alleviate a cor-
rectable problem, or improve the quality of life with or without
prolonging life. "Do not resuscitate" does not mean "do not
treat. '5 8 A physician must attempt to provide care and comfort
to the terminally ill patient. If a condition exists that could be
corrected or palliated by surgery, then this form of therapy
should not be denied a patient merely because the patient
wishes no CPR. For example, a patient with a fatal type of can-
cer who develops an intestinal obstruction could undergo a sur-
gical procedure to provide relief and prevent the horrible
sequelae and suffering that would result from allowing the intes-
tinal obstruction to run its natural course. A terminally ill can-
cer patient suffering intractable pain due to a tumor impinging
on the spinal cord could benefit from surgery to alleviate this
pain. A patient with terminal cancer with a tumor obstructing
the esophagus could have a tube placed through the tumor, re-
ceiving palliation that allows the patient to swallow food and
handle oral secretions. Other simpler procedures, such as a
tracheostomy, gastrostomy, or insertion of a central venous line
for infusion of fluids and drugs (especially analgesics), are all
meant to increase patient comfort, provide good nursing care,
and alleviate suffering. Each surgical procedure and each anes-
nal of Medicine on DNR orders in the operating room, 326 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1571,
1571 (June 4, 1992); Letter from Charles Couper, Children's Hospital, to the Journal
of the American Medical Association on DNR orders in the operating room, 267
JAMA 1465, 1465 (Mar. 18, 1992).
56. See Truog, DNR Orders, supra note 55, at 606.
57. Youngner, DNR in the Operating Room, supra note 55, at 2433.
58. Baskett, supra note 39, at 2.
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thetic administration carries with it a risk.5 9 The patient must
determine if the potential benefits of the surgical procedure to
better the quality of life are worth the risks of the intervention.
The ultimate risk, of course, is dying during or as a result of the
intervention.
As explained above, by definition, a patient with a DNR or-
der has a terminal illness-death is imminent. The patient, or
surrogate, has determined that there is no need to prolong the
dying process by means of resuscitation should a cardiac arrest
occur.60 However, in the operating room, it is important to un-
derstand the difference between a cardiac arrest that has oc-
curred as a result of an anesthetic or surgical act (or
misadventure) and one that has occurred as a result of the dis-
ease process that is the cause of the terminal illness.61 If the
arrest is caused by the disease process, then the presence of the
patient in the operating room is no different from the patient's
presence on the ward, and therefore it would be appropriate to
honor the DNR order and forgo resuscitation efforts. Quite to
the contrary, and particularly important to the issue, an arrest
resulting from the surgical procedure, if properly attended to,
will likely not cause an untoward result. Thus, if an arrest oc-
curs in the operating room as a result of the anesthetic or surgi-
cal intervention, resuscitation could be performed with success
and the patient may suffer no adverse effect.62
To illustrate, if a patient bleeds massively because a tumor re-
lated to the underlying illness eroded into a major vessel, the
terminal condition caused the patient's bleeding. However, if
the patient bleeds massively during a surgical exploration be-
cause the surgeon inadvertently severed a major blood vessel, it
is an iatrogenic complication and not the disease process that
caused the bleeding, and the surgeon has a fiduciary obligation
to do everything possible to stabilize the patient by repairing the
injury and, if necessary, resuscitating the patient. Of course, a
policy that requires a surgeon to pick and choose when to resus-
citate is unacceptable.
As explained above, the surgical ward is the environment in
which CPR can be performed most successfully. The operating
room is not an arena where personnel stand by idly and allow a
59. Walker, supra note 55, at 2408.
60. Cohen & Cohen, DNR Orders, supra note 55, at 1881.
61. Id. at 1880.
62. Truog, DNR Orders, supra note 55, at 607.
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patient to die. By the very nature of their training and everyday
activity, surgeons and anesthesiologists are aggressive interven-
tionalists who always attempt to resuscitate the dying patient.
Surgeons face daily critical situations where quick and decisive
action is required. In surgery, there may not be the luxury of
time to cerebrate about a problem, discuss it with one's col-
leagues, or research it thoroughly. Decisions have to be made
quickly in response to the situation presented. If a patient is
bleeding, the surgeon controls the bleeding; if a patient has low
blood pressure, the anesthesiologist administers fluids and
drugs; if a patient goes into cardiac arrest, the team resuscitates
immediately. No one would want the surgeon, anesthesiologist,
or team to waste valuable moments deciding whether to
respond.
Another issue arises from the very nature of anesthesia for
surgery. Anesthesia involves the deliberate depression and then
resuscitation and stabilization of vital signs. The anesthesiolo-
gist puts a patient to sleep by administering potent drugs that
reduce consciousness and paralyze the breathing mechanism.
This is followed by assisted ventilation and then placement of an
endotracheal tube for a secured airway. A drop in blood pres-
sure caused by the anesthetic may require stabilization by the
use of vasoactive drugs and fluids. All of these steps are routine
during an operation. But, performed under other circum-
stances, such as cardiac arrest, these steps are the very compo-
nents of resuscitation. Short of cardiac compressions and
countershock, anesthetic management is the same as cardi-
opulmonary resuscitation. In the operating room, these inter-
ventions are needed to maintain homeostasis (that is,
equilibrium of physiologic functions), and should not be viewed
as resuscitation.63 However, once cardiac arrest has occurred,
all interventions are considered rescue responses.
Since there can be no easy, logical, or mechanical response to
the issue of whether to resuscitate in surgery a patient with a
DNR order, hospitals must institute appropriate policies.
V. DNR POLICY IN THE OPERATING ROOM
It is imperative that surgeons, nurses, and other health care
providers know what to do in the operating room. Without hos-
pital guidance, ethical and legal dilemmas will arise. For exam-
63. Youngner, DNR in the Operating Room, supra note 55, at 2434.
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pie, if required to follow a DNR order in the operating room,
surgeons and anesthesiologists should only be expected to forgo
resuscitation, not the maintenance of homeostasis.64 But even
this seemingly logical and straightforward principle can cause
confusion as maintaining homeostasis consists of many of the
same actions as resuscitation. In addition, an ethical dilemma
will arise among operating room personnel who may feel that
their inactivity or failure to treat may be directly responsible for
a patient's death.65 Patients are not sent to the operating room
to die, and surgeons, anesthesiologists, and nurses have a re-
sponsibility to prevent the patient's demise.66 Likewise, death in
the operating room is looked upon as a "bad outcome" and may
adversely affect the psychology of the surgeon and operating
room personnel who are responsible for what happens to the
patient in the operating room.67 Operating room personnel are
uncomfortable with allowing a patient to die during an operative
procedure because of a DNR order.68
Unfortunately, not all hospitals have policies identifying how
to deal with a patient with a DNR order who is in the operating
room.6 9
When the patient enters the operating room, there are three
courses of action that may be taken as a matter of philosophical
and ethical approach, or as a matter of policy:
(1) automatic suspension of DNR orders,7 °
(2) strict adherence to the DNR status,71 or
(3) "required reconsideration" of DNR orders.'
Each of these options is discussed below.
A. Automatic Suspension of DNR Orders
Some hospitals automatically suspend DNR orders when pa-
tients enter operating rooms and then reinstate the orders upon
the patients' return to post-recovery rooms. There are several
64. Cohen & Cohen, DNR Orders, supra note 55, at 1880.
65. Id. at 1881.
66. Walker, supra note 55, at 2408.
67. Id.
68. Cohen & Cohen, DNR Orders, supra note 55, at 1881; Youngner, DNR in the
Operating Room, supra note 55, at 2434.
69. See LUMC DNR Policy, supra note 11; Truog, DNR Orders, supra note 55.
70. Id.; Walker, supra note 55, at 2407. See, e.g., Alexian Brothers DNR Policy,
supra note 13.
71. Walker, supra note 55, at 2407.
72. Cohen & Cohen, DNR Orders, supra note 55, at 1880.
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reasons why an automatic suspension of DNR orders in the op-
erating room could be an appropriate policy.
First, the patient who requests and consents to a surgical pro-
cedure agrees to a series of interventions, such as the adminis-
tration of an anesthetic, controlled ventilation, and the use of
vasoactive drugs, during the surgical procedure itself, which are,
as stated above, routine procedures for anyone undergoing sur-
gery necessary to maintain homeostatic stability; yet they are
also components of resuscitation. Arguably, a consent for sur-
gery, therefore, is a consent for "resuscitation," which contra-
venes the DNR order.
Second, there is a difference between a cardiopulmonary
arrest that occurs spontaneously (for example, from a myocar-
dial infarction, shock, cerebrovascular accident, or trauma)
outside the operating room and one that occurs as a result of a
therapeutic intervention in the operating room (for example, es-
ophageal intubation, pneumothorax, drug overdose, or sever-
ance of a blood vessel). There is a greater chance of successful
resuscitation with the latter than with the former incident. In
the operating room, an arrest that occurs during anesthesia
could be considered a result of surgical intervention and should
be reversible. The premise is that if cardiac arrest occurs during
or as a result of anesthesia, is immediately recognized, and is
properly treated, CPR is highly successful. In the surgical envi-
ronment, resuscitation or CPR would help the patient to achieve
the original objective in undergoing the surgical procedure and
with minimal risk of an untoward effect.
While patients may fear that inappropriate CPR could result
in a chronic vegetative state or prolonged intensive care, timely
and successful CPR to recover from cardiac arrest as a result of
anesthesia can actually prevent serious neurological damage.73
Third, each anesthetic agent causes hemodynamic instability.
The more unstable a patient, the lighter the anesthetic used to
minimize precarious hemodynamics. Vasoactive drugs (that is,
those directly affecting the heart and blood vessels) are used to
keep the patient physiologically stable. With a DNR order in
place during surgery, the patient would not be able to benefit
fully from the analgesic effect because the use would be very
conservative to keep the patient as stable as possible.74
73. See Truog, DNR Orders, supra note 55, at 607.
74. Id.
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The obvious drawback of automatically suspending the DNR
order during surgery is that it is inconsistent with the patient's
wishes. However, patients should be told of the policy when
providing consent for the surgical procedure. The hospital's pol-
icy must clearly identify when the DNR order is suspended and
when it is reinstated (for example, after the patient leaves the
post-recovery room).
B. Strict Adherence to the DNR Status
The second approach to dealing with the patient with a DNR
order while in the operating room is strictly adhering to this or-
der. A patient's rights, including the right to refuse resuscita-
tion, do not end at the operating room door. Automatic
suspension of a DNR order denies the patient the right of self-
determination, which entitles the patient to reject or request re-
suscitation. Strict adherence to the patient's right of self-deter-
mination requires the surgical team to follow the DNR order
unless it is rescinded by the patient or the patient's representa-
tive. Refusal of the patient's directive may not be legal in view
of this act.75 Therefore, an argument may be made to strictly
adhere to the request of DNR when the patient goes to the op-
erating room for surgical intervention.
The negative implications of such a policy are clear as ex-
plained above-maintenance of homeostasis can be compro-
mised, the surgical team may protest, and the positive results of
the consented-to surgery can be lost.
C. "Required Reconsideration" of DNR Orders
Blending the concepts discussed above-permitting the nor-
mal conduct of a surgical procedure and allowing for the expres-
sion of the patient's right-is the goal of the policy of "required
reconsideration." 76 As explained by the Association of Operat-
ing Room Nurses, this policy "allows a patient or surrogate to
participate in decisions about the use of cardiopulmonary resus-
citation ... [and] offers caregivers an opportunity to explain the
75. See Vicki Joiner Bowers, Advance Directives: Peace of Mind or False Security?,
26 STETSON L. Rv. 677, 721 (1996); The American Society of Anesthesiologists, Inc.,
Abstract, G. Boyd & A. Boudreaux, DNR Orders in the Operating Room: A Survey of
Anaesthesiologists' Opinions and Concerns, 75 ANESTHESIOLOGY A900 (1991).
76. Cynthia B. Cohen & Peter J. Cohen, Required Reconsideration of "Do-Not-
Resuscitate" Orders in the Operating Room and Certain Other Treatment Settings, 20
LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 354, 354 (1992) [hereinafter Cohen & Cohen, Required
Reconsideration].
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significance of cardiac arrest and resuscitation in the periopera-
tive setting. ' 77 It is the responsibility of the primary physician
and the surgeon to discuss with the patient or surrogate the de-
tails of the operation, its potential dangers, the types of therapy
that are usual during surgery, and the reasons for suspending a
DNR order during this period. The patient or surrogate will
then be able to make a decision of how to proceed. In this way,
the patient's right of self-determination is respected and the sur-
gical team knows exactly how to proceed.
The results of this decision must be documented in the pa-
tient's medical chart and the information shared with all mem-
bers of the health care team. If any member of the team is
uncomfortable with the patient's decision-whether to resusci-
tate or not during the surgical procedure-an alternative mem-
ber should be sought, but the expressed wishes of the patient
must be honored.
Certainly, this third option addresses the concerns of every-
one involved. However, it does not solve the problems raised
above for the patient who wishes to keep the DNR order stand-
ing during surgery.
Regardless of the position adopted by the hospital, it is imper-
ative that the hospital establish and articulate its policy.
CONCLUSION
Informed consent is the best process by which physicians ful-
fill their fiduciary responsibility to their patients. Pursuant to
the Patient Self-Determination Act, hospitals must now provide
patients with information about advance directives. Through
this vehicle, patients may discuss and document their wishes re-
garding the direction of therapy their providers should take
under circumstances when the patient is terminally ill or inca-
pacitated. Unless otherwise directed, by virtue of presumed
consent, the hospital's health care providers will automatically
resuscitate the hospitalized patient, should such action be neces-
77. Jackie L. Hamblet et al., Proposed AORN Position Statement on Perioperative
Care of Patients With Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) Orders, 61 AORN J. 60, 60 (1995).
The American College of Surgeons has adopted this position. Statement of the
American College of Surgeons on Advance Directives by Patients, "Do Not Resusci-
tate" in the Operating Room, 79 AM. C. SURGEONS BULL. 29 (1994); American Society
of Anesthesiologists, Ethical Guidelines for the Anesthesia Care of Patients With Do-
Not-Resuscitate Orders or Other Directives That Limit Treatment (Oct. 13, 1993) (on
fie with the Annals of Health Law).
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sary. When a patient or surrogate decides to forgo these resusci-
tative efforts, a DNR order is entered.
This does not imply that a terminally ill patient receives no
care or less care. If an operative intervention is undertaken to
alleviate pain and suffering, that procedure may alter the pa-
tient's homeostasis enough that some form of resuscitation-
even CPR-would be necessary. Since the surgeon's goal is not
to harm the patient, and the operative intervention should not
hasten the patient's death, resuscitation should be permitted
during the perioperative period, as is the standard of care for all
patients. However, patient autonomy must be respected.
To strictly adhere to a DNR order in the operating room
would be contrary to the goal of surgery and the surgical team's
obligations. To automatically suspend a DNR order upon entry
into the operating room is a paternalistic infringement on the
patient's right of self-determination. "Required reconsidera-
tion," however, addresses most concerns and allows for a
thoughtful solution to a complex problem with time on every-
one's side. 8 It allows the physician to follow the Hippocratic
oath and it gives the patient the opportunity to choose the ex-
tent of the treatment and thereby maintain dignity and
autonomy.
78. Cohen & Cohen, Required Reconsideration, supra note 76.
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